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We estimate the eﬀects of exogenous innovations to the
balance sheet of the ECB since the start of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis within a structural VAR framework. An expansionary bal-
ance sheet shock stimulates bank lending, reduces interest rate
spreads, leads to a depreciation of the euro, and has a positive
impact on economic activity and inﬂation. A counterfactual
analysis reveals that the macroeconomic consequences of the
balance sheet policies in the aftermath of the crisis have been
substantial. For example, euro-area output and inﬂation would
have been more than 1 percent lower in 2012 without the three-
year LTRO programs. Finally, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects on out-
put turn out to be smaller in the member countries that have
been more aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis, in particular those
countries where the banking system is less well capitalized.
JEL Codes: C32, E30, E44, E51, E52.
1. Introduction
There is a large literature that has used structural vector autore-
gressive (SVAR) models to examine the macroeconomic eﬀects
of changes in policy-controlled interest rates (e.g., Bernanke and
Blinder 1992; Bernanke and Mihov 1998; Christiano, Eichenbaum,
∗We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Luc Aucremanne, Pierpaolo
Benigno (editor), Hugues Famere´e, Pelin Ilbas, Raf Wouters, seminar participants
at Hamburg University and the National Bank of Belgium, and participants at
the “ECB Workshop on Non-standard Monetary Policies” for helpful comments.
Special thanks to our discussant Luca Benati at the ECB workshop. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those
of the National Bank of Belgium, the European Central Bank, or the Eurosystem.
297
298 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
and Evans 1999; Peersman and Smets 2003). VAR models are
reduced-form multivariate representations of macroeconomic vari-
ables. By imposing a minimum set of restrictions, it is possible
to identify the structural shocks that drive the variables, such as
exogenous innovations to the policy-controlled interest rate. Once
the shocks are identiﬁed, the SVAR model allows one to study the
dynamic responses of the variables to the shocks. There is con-
siderable agreement in this literature that a decline in the policy
rate leads to a hump-shaped temporary rise in economic activity,
while prices increase persistently. These eﬀects are typically used
as a benchmark for the construction of monetary general equilib-
rium models of the business cycle (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans 2005; Smets and Wouters 2007).
In contrast, little is known about the eﬀectiveness and pass-
through of monetary policy measures that expand the central bank
balance sheets for a given policy rate.1 Indeed, this is exactly what
the European Central Bank (ECB) and other major central banks
have done in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis to counter the risks
to macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability. The ECB, for instance,
shifted from a variable-rate tender to a ﬁxed-rate tender with full
allotment; in addition, the pool of collateral accepted for reﬁnanc-
ing operations has been enlarged and liquidity to banks has been
provided at longer maturities than in the pre-crisis period. The
ECB also conducted outright purchases of ﬁnancial assets like cov-
ered bonds, asset-backed securities, and government bonds. A better
understanding of the transmission mechanism and impact of such
balance sheet policies on the macroeconomy is not only essential for
policymakers, it is also important to construct theoretical monetary
models for the analysis of unconventional monetary policy and the
ﬁnancial crisis.
In this study, we apply the SVAR methodology to analyze
the macroeconomic eﬀects and transmission mechanism of shocks
to the ECB’s balance sheet that are orthogonal to real economy
1The literature on the eﬀects of so-called unconventional monetary pol-
icy, however, has been growing recently. Theoretical examples are Curdia and
Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). Empirical applications are
Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010), Peersman (2011), Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and
Peydro (2013), Fahr et al. (2013), and Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman
(2014).
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ﬂuctuations, disturbances in ﬁnancial markets, changes in the
demand for central bank liquidity, and conventional innovations to
the policy rate. We focus exclusively on the period between the onset
of the ﬁnancial crisis and the start of the Expanded Asset Purchase
Program (EAPP).2 More precisely, we ﬁrst estimate a benchmark
monthly SVAR model for the euro area containing output, consumer
prices, the policy rate, central bank total assets, the CISS indicator
of ﬁnancial stress, and the spread between EONIA and the policy
rate over the sample period 2007:M1–2014:M12. We ﬁnd that an
exogenous expansion in total assets leads to a signiﬁcant but tem-
porary rise in output and prices. The dynamic eﬀects are very similar
to the ones typically found in the literature on conventional inter-
est rate innovations. This conﬁrms that a central bank can also use
its balance sheet to inﬂuence the real economy without altering the
policy rate.
In a second step, we extend the VAR model and estimate the
impact of balance sheet shocks on a set of ﬁnancial market and
banking-sector variables in order to shed more light on the transmis-
sion channels. We ﬁnd that an exogenous rise in the ECB’s balance
sheet improves bank lending conditions for households and ﬁrms in
the euro area, increasing the volume of bank lending signiﬁcantly.
Furthermore, the exchange rate depreciates, and there is a fall in
money-market spreads as well as the intra-euro-area sovereign bond
spreads vis-a`-vis Germany. These results suggest that balance sheet
policies of the ECB are also eﬀective to counter risks to ﬁnancial
stability. On the other hand, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact on
(risk-free) German government bond yields.
To assess whether the consequences of the non-standard mone-
tary policies have been economically meaningful, we then use the
VAR model to conduct two counterfactual simulations. First, we
simulate how the economy would have evolved without the one-
year long-term reﬁnancing operations (LTROs) and the ﬁrst Cov-
ered Bond Purchases Program (CBPP1), two measures that were
launched in the summer of 2009. Second, a similar exercise is done
2Because the volume of asset purchases of the EAPP are anticipated a long
time beforehand, and the EAPP can be considered as a monetary policy regime
shift, we believe that the VAR model and identiﬁcation strategy that we use are
not appropriate to assess its eﬀectiveness.
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for the three-year LTROs executed in December 2011 and March
2012. Both simulations reveal that the balance sheet policies shel-
tered the euro-area economy from worse counterfactual scenarios.
For example, the recovery of economic activity and pickup of inﬂa-
tion in 2010 would have been much more sluggish without the two
measures taken in 2009, while output and inﬂation would have been
more than 1 percent lower in 2012 without the three-year LTROs.
Finally, we estimate the impact of the balance sheet shocks on
output and prices in individual euro-area countries. The eﬀects on
prices are quite similar across countries. The output eﬀects, however,
are more diverse. In particular, we ﬁnd a more subdued or insignif-
icant impact in those countries that have been more aﬀected by
the ﬁnancial crisis (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, and Spain). The
responses of output across countries turn out to correlate positively
with the degree of capitalization of national banking sectors, which
suggests that the solvency of the banking sector might be important
for the eﬀectiveness of the ECB’s balance sheet policies.
This study is related to Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman
(2014), who estimate a panel VAR for eight industrialized coun-
tries and ﬁnd favorable eﬀects of central bank balance sheet shocks
on output and inﬂation since the start of the crisis, but it diﬀers
in some important aspects. First, in the meantime we have several
more years of data, which allows us to estimate a VAR model for a
single currency. This implies that we do not have to pool data from
diﬀerent policy regimes and relatively diverse economic structures,
which could distort the results. Second, our identiﬁcation strategy
of the shocks is much better tailored for the euro area. For exam-
ple, Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2014) do not distinguish
between policy-induced and demand-driven innovations to the bal-
ance sheet of the central bank. While this is an appropriate approach
for most industrialized countries, as discussed in the next sections,
this could be misleading for the euro area given the ﬁxed-rate tender
with full allotment strategy of the ECB. A further isolation of policy-
induced innovations is thus a relevant methodological extension of
the present paper. Third, Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman
(2014) do not examine the transmission mechanism to bank lending
and ﬁnancial market variables, nor the diﬀerences across individual
euro-area member countries, which are essential extensions to better
understand the macro consequences.
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When we compare our ﬁndings with existing theoretical con-
tributions on the eﬀects of balance sheet policies, the area-wide
results appear to be consistent with the models of Curdia and
Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). Speciﬁcally, Curdia
and Woodford (2011) demonstrate that central bank credit policies
(targeted purchases of private assets) can be eﬀective in stimulating
economic activity by lowering credit spreads when ﬁnancial markets
are suﬃciently impaired. In a bank-based ﬁnancial system, such as
the euro area, an increase in the volume of liquidity provision to
banks by the ECB can be considered as a way to expand credit
to the private sector. The rise in the volume of bank lending to
households and ﬁrms, and the decline of interest rate spreads that
we ﬁnd are thus in line with the predictions of their model. Cahn,
Matheron, and Sahuc (2014) apply the model of Gertler and Karadi
(2011) to the euro area and show that liquidity injections by the ECB
into the banking sector could be eﬀective in stimulating aggregate
demand, because this alleviates balance sheet constraints of ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries, increasing bank lending. The area-wide results
could indeed be interpreted as evidence in favor of the ability of the
central bank to relax commercial banks’ balance sheet constraints.
On the other hand, the cross-country diﬀerences, with weaker eﬀects
in countries that were more hit by the crisis, are much harder to rec-
oncile with these models. This is an issue that should be tackled in
future research.
Some caution when interpreting the results is, however, required.
In particular, the estimations represent the average impact of a
generic series of exogenous balance sheet innovations during the cri-
sis period. The shocks are thus a mixture of diﬀerent policy actions
aﬀecting the ECB’s balance sheet, the eﬀects of which are not nec-
essarily the same. This also applies to the counterfactuals, which are
based on the average eﬀects. The latter are also sensitive to the Lucas
critique. More precisely, the counterfactuals implicitly assume that
there are no changes in the deep structure of the economy without
the interventions. Furthermore, since our sample period only covers
the crisis period, the results do not necessarily imply that balance
sheet policies are generally eﬀective to inﬂuence the macroeconomy,
i.e., also in non-crisis periods. Similarly, it is not clear whether the
eﬀectiveness and estimated magnitudes depend on the presence of a
(zero) lower bound on risk-free rates. Nevertheless, the results could
302 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
serve as a benchmark for further theoretical and empirical research
on the transmission of balance sheet policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we provide an overview of the most important unconven-
tional monetary policy measures of the ECB in the wake of the
global ﬁnancial crisis, and their inﬂuence on the central bank balance
sheet. Section 3 presents the benchmark VAR model and the identiﬁ-
cation strategy to isolate exogenous balance sheet innovations. That
section also relates the identiﬁcation strategy to the theoretical lit-
erature on balance sheet policies. Section 4 reports the results of
the benchmark estimations, whereas the impact on ﬁnancial market
and banking-sector variables is shown in section 5. In section 6, we
report the counterfactual simulations, while the cross-country diﬀer-
ences within the euro area are analyzed in section 7. Finally, section
8 concludes.
2. The Balance Sheet of the ECB and the Financial
Crisis
The ﬁnancial crisis has aﬀected the balance sheet of the ECB in
several waves. From the summer of 2007 onwards, euro-area banks
suﬀered signiﬁcant losses from the fallout of the subprime mortgage
crisis in the United States. As a consequence, banks started to have
doubts about their counterparties in the interbank market, which
resulted in a shortage of liquidity and a collapse of activity in many
ﬁnancial market segments. In addition, several banks began to build
up large liquidity buﬀers. To accommodate banks’ increased (and
unpredictable) demand for liquidity, the ECB started with several
liquidity-providing operations in the second half of 2007. This con-
tinued until the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when the ECB decided
to conduct a ﬁxed interest rate with full allotment (FRFA) policy. In
particular, from October 2008 onwards, banks had unlimited access
to liquidity from the ECB at a pre-speciﬁed interest rate, as long as
they could provide the required collateral. As can be seen in ﬁgure 1,
this resulted in a ﬁrst serious expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet.
At the same time, the ECB also decreased its key interest rates to
very low levels.
Crucial for the analysis in this paper is that the FRFA pol-
icy has remained in place throughout the crisis for all standard
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Figure 1. Balance Sheet of the ECB (Assets) in the
Aftermath of the Financial Crisis
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liquidity-providing operations of the ECB, although it was sus-
pended temporarily for three-month operations in the spring of
2010. Speciﬁcally, the main challenge of this study lies in identifying
changes in the balance sheet that could be interpreted as exogenous
monetary policy decisions, i.e., not the result of movements in other
variables. The FRFA policy, however, implies that ﬂuctuations in
the volume of liquidity distributed by the ECB to the banking sec-
tor between October 2008 and the launch of the Expanded Asset
Purchase Program in early 2015 were essentially demand driven.
Nevertheless, shifts in the volume of lending to the banking sector
that are the consequence of deliberate monetary policy decisions
were still possible and did happen during that period. In particu-
lar, the ECB has conducted a number of non-standard monetary
policy measures that raised the demand for liquidity by banks and
hence the size of its balance sheet, such as alterations to the col-
lateral requirements for its liquidity-providing operations. The list
of eligible collateral accepted in the reﬁnancing operations has been
extended several times, e.g., in October 2008 and December 2011,
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allowing banks to reﬁnance less liquid assets, expanding the balance
sheet of the ECB. On the other hand, the collateral framework has
also been made more restrictive at some points in time, e.g., by
limiting the range of eligible assets or by changing haircuts.3
The ECB has also stimulated liquidity demand from the banking
sector by extending the maximum maturity of its longer-term reﬁ-
nancing operations (LTROs). Whereas in the pre-crisis period the
ECB only oﬀered operations with a maturity up to three months,
the maximum maturity was extended to six months in February
2009, then to twelve months in June 2009. There have also been two
very important reﬁnancing operations with a maturity of thirty-six
months in December 2011 and March 2012 (and an option to repay
the funds after one year) and a series of so-called targeted LTROs
with a (maximum) maturity of forty-eight months from the summer
of 2014 onwards. The latter provide funding for banks that expand
their lending to the private sector. As shown in ﬁgure 1, all these
operations got considerable interest by banks, boosting the balance
sheet of the ECB. Furthermore, in order to alleviate banks’ funding
problems in foreign currency, the ECB has oﬀered funding in foreign
currency, such as U.S. dollars and Swiss francs, in cooperation with
other central banks. These operations have at times been suspended
and reintroduced, resulting in balance sheet ﬂuctuations that are at
least partly the consequence of policy decisions.
The ECB has further conducted several outright asset purchase
programs during the sample period, which inﬂuenced the size of its
balance sheet (see ﬁgure 1). Speciﬁcally, the ECB conducted two
Covered Bond Purchase Programs (CBPPs) between June 2009 and
October 2012, which implied outright purchases of €76.4 billion in
covered bonds issued by banks in the euro area. Between May 2010
and the summer of 2012, the ECB also intervened several times in
the secondary markets of some euro-area government bonds in the
context of its Securities Markets Program (SMP). Overall, the ECB
bought €219.5 billion of government bonds in the context of the SMP.
In addition, a third CBPP has been launched since October 2014, as
well as an asset-backed securities purchase program (ABSPP) since
November 2014.
3In early 2009, for instance, the ECB raised its rating threshold for ABSs from
one A rating to two AAA ratings at issuance.
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In sum, there have been several deliberate monetary policy deci-
sions after the introduction of the FRFA policy (which was in fact
also a policy decision) that had an inﬂuence on the balance sheet of
the ECB. Hence, it should be possible to isolate exogenous policy-
induced balance sheet shocks. The identiﬁcation strategy to do so
will be discussed in the next section. Notice that we explicitly end
our sample period in December 2014. More speciﬁcally, in January
2015, the Governing Council of the ECB announced an Expanded
Asset Purchase Program (EAPP—mainly public debt securities)
of €60 billion per month until at least September 2016. Since the
monthly volumes of the purchases are announced several months in
advance, these shifts in the balance sheet of the ECB after January
2015 can therefore no longer be considered unanticipated shocks.
3. Euro-Area SVAR Model for the Financial Crisis
3.1 Benchmark Speciﬁcation
Structural VAR models are typically used to estimate the macro-
economic eﬀects of conventional monetary policy innovations, e.g.,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) for the United States and
Peersman and Smets (2003) for the euro area. SVARs impose very
little theoretical structure on the data and can be used to establish
some relevant stylized facts. In this paper, we also use the SVAR
methodology to explore the dynamic eﬀects of unconventional mon-
etary policies. The benchmark VAR model that we consider has the
following representation:
Yt = α + A (L)Yt−1 + Bεt, (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, α a vector of con-
stants, A (L) a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, and B
the contemporaneous impact matrix of the mutually uncorrelated
disturbances ε.
In the benchmark speciﬁcation, the vector of endogenous vari-
ables Yt contains six euro-area variables: the log of seasonally
adjusted real GDP, the log of seasonally adjusted consumer prices,
the log of central bank total assets, the level of ﬁnancial stress as
measured by the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS), the
spread between EONIA and the main reﬁnancing operations (MRO)
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rate, and the MRO policy rate. The VARs in this study are estimated
in (log) levels over the sample period 2007:M1–2014:M12.4
Several remarks about the VAR model and selection of variables
are worth mentioning. First, a number of empirical studies on uncon-
ventional monetary policy use data starting before the ﬁnancial crisis
(e.g., Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin 2010; Peersman 2011; Giannone et
al. 2012). However, this may not be adequate to assess the eﬀects
of the policy measures that were taken in the aftermath of the
ﬁnancial crisis. Speciﬁcally, banks and sovereign bond markets in
the euro area behaved very diﬀerently in the ﬁnancial crisis com-
pared to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, before the summer of 2007,
the ECB never explicitly used its balance sheet as a policy tool to
inﬂuence macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market conditions.5 This is
why our sample period starts in 2007. Conversely, this implies that
our results are only representative for a period of severe ﬁnancial
stress, where also the policy rate reached its (zero) lower bound. It
is thus not clear whether our results are also valid for balance sheet
policies in normal times and high(er) interest rate regimes. Curdia
and Woodford (2011), for example, show that balance sheet poli-
cies might only be eﬀective when ﬁnancial markets are suﬃciently
disrupted.
Second, the benchmark speciﬁcation should capture the main
macroeconomic, ﬁnancial, and monetary interactions during the
ﬁnancial crisis. Output and prices represent the macroeconomic
developments in the sample period, while the MRO rate captures
conventional monetary policy. The central bank balance sheet vari-
able that we use in the estimations is ECB total assets, whose
dynamics most closely resemble the balance sheet measures dis-
cussed in section 2, i.e., additional lending to banks and securities
held for monetary policy purposes. Notice that Curdia and Woodford
4Estimation in (log) levels allows for implicit cointegration relationships in
the data (Sims, Stock, and Watson 1990). Given the short sample available, we
do not perform an explicit analysis of the long-run behavior of the economy. For
real GDP, we construct a monthly measure using the Chow-Lin interpolation
procedure and monthly industrial production as a reference series.
5One notable example of a change in the size of the balance sheet that was not
related to the monetary policy stance of the ECB is the drop in the balance sheet
prior to the changeover of national banknotes into euro banknotes in January
2002.
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(2011) argue that only targeted purchases of private assets (credit
policy) can stimulate the economy, while purchases of (riskless)
treasury bonds are not eﬀective in stimulating aggregate demand.
This might suggest that it is mainly the composition of the balance
sheet, rather than total assets, that matters for the eﬀectiveness
of balance sheet policies. However, the ECB did not implement its
policy via purchases of risk-free treasury bonds before 2015. The
bulk of the interventions were reﬁnancing operations with commer-
cial banks. Accordingly, changes in the size of the balance sheet are
suﬃcient to capture the exposure of the ECB to the private sector.
Speciﬁcally, in a ﬁnancial system that is mainly bank based, such
as the euro area, an increase in the exposure of the central bank
to the banking system is the most straightforward way of expand-
ing the volume of credit to the private sector. This is also the case
for the SMP government bond purchases by the ECB. The rise in
the ECB’s total assets related to these purchases was arguably not
a simple exchange of risk-free government debt for risk-free central
bank reserves, since these bonds were issued by euro-area countries
under severe ﬁnancial stress. The purchases in the context of SMP
can instead be considered a form of credit policy, in particular given
the fact that these bonds were impairing the credit intermediation
capacity of commercial banks.
As an alternative for total assets of the ECB, we could use
liabilities-based measures such as the monetary base. However, deci-
sions related to, for instance, the SMP would then not be included.
The purchases under this program have been sterilized during our
sample, and therefore do not aﬀect the monetary base. Nevertheless,
the results prove to be robust when we use the monetary base as the
balance sheet indicator.6
Third, we include the CISS indicator of Hollo´, Kremer, and Lo
Duca (2012) in the benchmark VAR model in order to capture ﬁnan-
cial stress and economic risk during the sample period. The CISS
indicator summarizes information on ﬁnancial stress in euro-area
money markets, bond markets, equity markets, foreign exchange
markets, and ﬁnancial intermediaries. Conditioning on such an indi-
cator is also crucial to disentangle exogenous changes in the central
6These results are available upon request.
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bank balance sheet from endogenous responses to ﬁnancial stress
and uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, as discussed in section 2, innovations
to the balance sheet could be demand induced due to the FRFA
policy, whereas several unconventional monetary policy measures of
the ECB were taken in direct reaction to ﬁnancial and macroeco-
nomic jitters. Failing to take into account the endogenous response of
the balance sheet to ﬁnancial turbulence and economic uncertainty
could seriously bias the estimation results (Gambacorta, Hofmann,
and Peersman 2014). Indeed, ﬁgure 2 shows that the year-on-year
percentage change in total ECB assets is closely related to the CISS
indicator. The positive co-movement between both variables mainly
reﬂects the endogenous response of the balance sheet to ﬁnancial
stress.7 Finally, the benchmark VAR includes the spread between
EONIA and the MRO rate, which will also be useful for the identi-
ﬁcation of exogenous balance sheet shocks.
3.2 Identiﬁcation of Balance Sheet Shocks
Isolating exogenous balance sheet shocks involves making identify-
ing assumptions. As explained in section 2, ﬂuctuations in the ECB’s
balance sheet are a combination of changes in monetary policy that
could be interpreted as exogenous and an endogenous response to
developments in the economy. The latter reﬂects, in turn, the sys-
tematic reaction of monetary policy to ﬁnancial stress and macroeco-
nomic ﬂuctuations, as well as the demand-driven nature of the FRFA
policy.8 To identify exogenous innovations to the balance sheet, we
use a mixture of zero and sign restrictions on the contemporaneous
matrix B in equation (1), which can be found in table 1.
7The positive correlation between the size of the balance sheet and our indica-
tor of ﬁnancial stress is analogous to the positive correlation between interest rates
and inﬂation in conventional monetary policy VARs. Also in that case, the pos-
itive (unconditional) correlation is mainly the result of an endogenous response
of monetary policy to changes in prices, rather than exogenous monetary policy
shocks which drive interest rates and prices in opposite directions.
8The benchmark estimations reveal that only 25 percent of the forecast error
variance decomposition of total ECB assets at horizon 0 is driven by unconven-
tional balance sheet shocks, which even declines to 6 percent at longer horizons.
Fluctuations in the ECB’s balance sheet are thus mainly endogenously driven
by other shocks in the economy, which underscores the importance of isolating
exogenous innovations.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Eﬀectiveness and Transmission 309
Figure 2. ECB Balance Sheet and Financial Stress
in the Euro Area
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Table 1. Identiﬁcation of an (Unconventional) Central
Bank Balance Sheet Shock
CB Total EONIA–MRO Policy
Output Prices Assets CISS Spread Rate
0 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 0
First, we assume that there is only a lagged impact of a balance
sheet shock on output and consumer prices, i.e., the contempora-
neous impact on both variables is restricted to be zero. Conversely,
innovations to output and prices are allowed to have an immedi-
ate eﬀect on the balance sheet of the central bank. This assumption,
which is also made in most VAR studies on the eﬀects of conventional
monetary policy shocks (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999; Peersman and Smets 2003),
is plausible for monthly estimations, and allows us to disentangle
monetary policy shocks from real economy disturbances such as
aggregate supply and demand shocks.
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Second, we assume that an unconventional monetary policy
shock that increases the balance sheet of the ECB does not increase
ﬁnancial stress. This restriction, which embodies the notion that
exogenous innovations to the balance sheet have a mitigating eﬀect
on ﬁnancial stress, is required to disentangle such innovations from
the endogenous response of the balance sheet to ﬁnancial stress. See
Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2014) for a similar reason-
ing.9 In particular, it follows as a complementary restriction from the
assumption that central bank assets typically increase in response
to a rise in the CISS indicator. The latter reﬂects the idea that (i)
the ECB reacts to increased ﬁnancial stress by expanding its balance
sheet, and (ii) due to the FRFA policy, the balance sheet of the ECB
rises endogenously when ﬁnancial market uncertainty increases.
Third, we assume that an expansionary balance sheet shock does
not increase the EONIA–MRO spread. Also this restriction is moti-
vated by the FRFA policy and the accompanying unlimited access
of banks to central bank liquidity. Speciﬁcally, there could have been
(exogenous) shocks to the demand for bank reserves without a pol-
icy action from the ECB, which have lowered the CISS indicator
and augmented the size of the central bank balance sheet during the
sample period. A rise in the demand for bank reserves, however, typ-
ically raises EONIA, and hence also the EONIA–MRO spread for a
given policy rate. In contrast, an expansionary balance sheet shock
that is the consequence of an unconventional monetary policy action
typically increases the liquidity surplus, exerting downward pres-
sure on EONIA and the spread with the policy rate.10 This restric-
tion is an extension to the identiﬁcation strategy of Gambacorta,
Hofmann, and Peersman (2014), who do not disentangle demand-
driven from policy-induced balance sheet innovations for a panel of
9Instead of the CISS indicator, Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2014)
use the VIX indicator, which only captures stock market volatility. Notice that
this restriction implies that expansions in the balance sheet which did lead to
increased ﬁnancial markets volatility are not identiﬁed and hence captured by
the other innovations in the VAR.
10Notice that not all unconventional monetary policy measures imply down-
ward pressure on EONIA. The impact of the SMP on liquidity, for instance, has
been sterilized. Moreover, EONIA can never fall below the interest rate on the
deposit facility of the ECB. To account for this, the sign restriction is implemented
in a weak form.
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eight industrialized countries. However, given the FRFA of the ECB,
such a distinction is important for the euro area.
Finally, given that we want to estimate the dynamic eﬀects of
innovations to the ECB’s balance sheet that are orthogonal to shifts
in the policy rate, the identiﬁed shocks have a zero contemporaneous
impact on the MRO rate.
All sign restrictions are imposed on impact and the ﬁrst
month after the shock, and implemented in a weak form, i.e., as
smaller/larger than or equal to zero. This allows for the possibil-
ity that an unconventional monetary policy measure, for example,
inﬂuences the CISS indicator immediately but inﬂuences central
bank assets only with a lag. Hence, it accommodates for the fact
that some monetary policy decisions are announced before they are
implemented.
4. Benchmark Estimation Results
The VAR is estimated over the sample period 2007:M1–2014:M12.
Data were taken from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and
Datastream. Based on the usual lag-length selection criteria, the esti-
mations include three lags of the endogenous variables. Most criteria
even suggest a shorter lag length, but the results proved robust to
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the lag length. We use a Bayesian approach
for estimation and inference. The prior and posterior distributions
of the reduced-form VAR belong to the Normal-Wishart family. To
draw the “candidate truths” from the posterior, we take a joint draw
from the posteriors of the reduced-form VAR parameters, as well as a
random possible decomposition B of the variance-covariance matrix.
If the draw of the VAR system is stationary and satisﬁes the restric-
tions, the draw is kept. Otherwise, the draw is rejected by giving
it a zero prior weight. For details of the estimation procedure and
implementation of restrictions, we refer to Peersman (2005) or Uhlig
(2005). Ten thousand successful draws from the posterior are used
to produce the ﬁgures.11
11The results are robust when we use the approach of Arias, Rubio-Ramirez,
and Waggoner (2014) for the implementation of the restrictions. See also Benati
(2014) for a discussion of the robustness of our results.
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Figure 3. Time Series of Cumulative Identiﬁed
Balance Sheet Shocks
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4.1 Time Series of Exogenous Balance Sheet Innovations
Before we discuss the dynamic eﬀects and transmission mechanism
of the balance sheet shocks, we ﬁrst examine the time series of the
identiﬁed shocks. An inspection of the time series of the shocks
should help to interpret their exact source more carefully, and assess
whether the major measures taken by the ECB in the aftermath of
the crisis are captured by the estimated innovations. Figure 3 shows
the median cumulative time series of the balance sheet shocks. The
scale is measured in standard deviations of the innovations. By con-
struction, the sum of the shocks is zero over the whole sample period.
A rise in the cumulative shock series implies an expansionary bal-
ance sheet shock, while a decline reﬂects a tightening of the balance
sheet relative to the average endogenous response to the other shocks
hitting the economy.
The ﬁgure reveals that the identiﬁed shocks capture the dates
of important unconventional monetary policy measures. As most
decisions have to some extent an unexpected component, this indi-
cates that our identiﬁcation strategy is plausible. Examples of (series
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of) expansionary balance sheet shocks identiﬁed by the VAR model
are the ﬁrst series of non-standard liquidity providing operations in
the summer of 2007, the decision of the Governing Council to oﬀer
U.S. dollar funding to Eurosystem counterparties in March 2008,
the FRFA policy and the easing of collateral requirements in Octo-
ber 2008, the CBPP and one-year LTROs in 2009, the three-year
LTROs of December 2011 and March 2012, the easing of collateral
requirements and the announcement that the FRFA will be contin-
ued “for as long as necessary and at least another six months” in
June 2012, several modiﬁcations to the risk control framework in
July 2013, and the targeted LTROs (TLTROs) launched at the end
of the sample period. Somewhat surprising, the start of the SMP in
May 2010 and the second phase of considerable government bond
purchases under this program in the summer of 2011 are not iden-
tiﬁed as expansionary balance sheet shocks, which implies that the
corresponding rise in the ECB’s balance sheet can mainly be con-
sidered an endogenous reaction to the ongoing macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial jitters.12
The periods that are identiﬁed as restrictive balance sheet shocks
are typically associated with a lack of policy measures, despite a
worsening of economic conditions and ﬁnancial stability. Examples
are the banking crisis in 2009 and the sovereign debt crisis in 2011.
Also, the end of the one-year LTROs and completion of the ﬁrst
CBPP in June 2010 are identiﬁed as a tightening of the (unconven-
tional) monetary policy stance. Interestingly, the early repayments
of three-year LTROs in January 2013 resulted in a negative shock
to the balance sheet of more than one standard deviation. Such neg-
ative shock could be related to a desire by counterparties to avoid
stigma attached to using the LTROs by signaling improvements in
their funding conditions (ECB 2013a). In sum, we can conclude
that the identiﬁed balance sheet shocks make sense, and capture
the most important non-standard monetary policy measures of the
ECB during the sample period.
12Notice that the August 2012 announcement of the Outright Monetary Trans-
actions (OMT) program is not identiﬁed as a balance sheet shock either, which
can be explained by the fact that this program has not involved any actual pur-
chases during our sample period. Potential eﬀects are thus captured by the other
innovations in the VAR system.
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4.2 Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation
balance sheet innovation. The dotted lines are the median impulse
responses of the posterior distributions, while the shaded areas rep-
resent the 68 percent posterior probability regions of the estimated
responses. The shock is characterized by an increase in total ECB
assets between 1.0 and 2.5 percent, which fades out after about six
months. While being (weakly) imposed by the sign restriction on
impact and the ﬁrst month after the shock, an expansionary bal-
ance sheet shock leads to a signiﬁcant decline of the CISS indicator
that lasts for more than one year. Also, the spread between EONIA
and the MRO rate is assumed to fall on impact, but remains negative
for about ﬁve months.
The dynamics of real GDP and consumer prices reveal that the
unconventional balance sheet policies conducted by the ECB in the
aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis were eﬀective in supporting the
macroeconomy. Both variables display a signiﬁcant increase after
an expansion in the central bank balance sheet. Real GDP is found
to rise with a peak eﬀect after about nine months of approximately
0.1 percentage points, and to gradually return after eighteen months
to the value it would have taken without the balance sheet shock.
Compared to the existing evidence on the transmission of conven-
tional monetary policy shocks that are associated with a change in
the short-term interest rate, the response pattern of output turns
out to be qualitatively very similar. The impact on consumer prices
is, however, somewhat diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, as can be seen in ﬁgure
4, the pattern of consumer prices coincides more or less with that
of the output response following a balance sheet shock, while the
impact of interest rate shocks on the price level is typically found
to be very sluggish, with a peak only after about two years or
more.
Finally, we observe a tightening of the policy rate after a couple
of months, which reﬂects the average conventional monetary pol-
icy reaction function during the sample period, i.e., the stabiliza-
tion of output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations by the ECB. This is not
a surprise, given that the policy rate did ﬂuctuate during the sam-
ple period and only reached its (zero) lower bound at the end of
the sample period (from 15 to 5 basis points in September 2014).
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Figure 4. Impulse Responses to Balance Sheet Shocks
in the Euro Area
Output Prices
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Note: Figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles
of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly.
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Accordingly, we should consider the magnitudes of the estimated
output and inﬂationary eﬀects as a lower bound of the eﬀectiveness
of balance sheet shocks. More precisely, the macroeconomic eﬀects
should in principle be larger when the policy rate does not react
to the stimulative eﬀects of the liquidity injections, a premise that
has theoretically also been shown by Cahn, Matheron, and Sahuc
(2014).
5. Transmission Channels
In this section, we analyze the transmission channels of the cen-
tral bank balance sheet shocks to the real economy in more detail.
Given that borrowing and lending in the euro area predominantly
take place through the intermediation of the banking system, and
most ECB unconventional monetary policy actions were primarily
aimed at inﬂuencing the banking sector, we ﬁrst examine the impact
of the shocks on a set of bank lending variables. In a next step, we
assess whether the balance sheet policies also had an impact on a
number of ﬁnancial market variables that are not included in the
benchmark model. We do this by extending the basic SVAR model
as follows:[
Yt
Zt
]
=
[
α
γ
]
+
[
A(L) 0
C(L) D(L)
] [
Yt−1
Zt−1
]
+
[
B 0
E F
] [
εt
vt
]
. (2)
We use a block-diagonal structure to estimate the eﬀects of a
balance sheet shock on the banking and ﬁnancial market variables,
i.e., we estimate a so-called near-VAR. As before, Yt is a vector of
the benchmark endogenous variables, and B the contemporaneous
impact matrix of the shocks εt. Zt is a vector containing the banking
or ﬁnancial variables of interest. Each time, we include two (related)
variables in Zt—for instance, the volume of bank lending to house-
holds and the corresponding lending rate. The variables are paired
along the rows of the ﬁgures, i.e., the two variables of a single row
in the ﬁgures are each time included as a pair in the near-VAR. We
should point out, however, that the choice of pairing does not inﬂu-
ence the estimates. In order to keep the balance sheet shock and the
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dynamics of the benchmark variables invariant to the inclusion of
the additional variables, we assume that the banking and ﬁnancial
market variables do not aﬀect the block of the benchmark endoge-
nous variables. This approach is very similar to that of Peersman
and Smets (2003), who estimate the impact of a conventional mon-
etary policy shock on various euro-area macroeconomic variables.
The CISS indicator—reﬂecting stress in the banking system and a
wide range of asset markets—should be a suﬃcient proxy to capture
the state of ﬁnancial and banking markets.13
The procedure to estimate the near-VARs is very similar to the
benchmark model of the previous section. The only diﬀerence is that
near-VARs require Gibbs sampling to draw the “candidate truths”
from the posterior. We discard the ﬁrst 5,000 draws as “burn-in”
and then use 10,000 successful draws from the posterior to produce
the ﬁgures. We assess for convergence of the ergodic distribution by
computing the draws’ ineﬃciency factors, which are the inverse of
Geweke’s spectral-based measure of relative numerical eﬃciency of
the draws. The ineﬃciency factors are always far below the value of
20, typically even below 0.005, providing evidence of convergence to
the ergodic distribution.
5.1 Bank Lending
The dynamic eﬀects of a balance sheet shock on a set of euro-area
bank lending variables are shown in ﬁgure 5. The results suggest that
the unconventional monetary policy measures of the ECB did sup-
port bank lending to households and ﬁrms during the ﬁnancial crisis.
In particular, the volume of lending both to non-ﬁnancial corpora-
tions and to households rises signiﬁcantly following an expansion in
the central bank balance sheet for a given policy rate. The peak of
the response of loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations is later than the
peak of loans to households. This is in line with existing evidence,
which typically ﬁnds that loans to households move contempora-
neously with output, whereas loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations
tend to lag output (ECB 2013b). These ﬁndings are also consistent
13As a robustness check, we have also estimated VARs where the additional
variables are included in the block of benchmark endogenous variables. The
results are very similar.
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Figure 5. Impact of Balance Sheet Shocks on Bank
Lending in the Euro Area
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Note: Figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles
of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly.
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with those of Aﬃnito (2013), who ﬁnds that lending reacts pos-
itively to changes in unconventional monetary policy using micro
ﬁrm data.
The impulse responses of the interest rates charged on loans to
households and ﬁrms denote that the rise in the volume of lending
is essentially supply driven. In particular, while the volume of lend-
ing increases, there is a decline of both lending rates in the short
run after an expansionary balance sheet shock. The increase in bank
lending rates after six months is in line with the endogenous reaction
of the policy rate documented before. The impact on bank lending
is consistent with the existence of a bank lending channel of balance
sheet policies. This is further supported by the regular Bank Lending
Survey (BLS) conducted by the ECB on supply and demand condi-
tions of bank loans.14 The question on supply conditions asks how
the bank has changed its credit standards for loans or credit lines to,
respectively, households and ﬁrms. The question on demand condi-
tions asks how the demand for loans and credit lines by households
and ﬁrms has changed, apart from normal seasonal ﬂuctuations. The
bottom part of ﬁgure 5 shows the impulse responses of both indices
to the identiﬁed shocks. A decline in the supply index implies a
loosening of credit standards, whereas a fall in the demand index
corresponds to a decline in loan demand. The impulse responses
reveal that supply conditions are signiﬁcantly loosened after a shock
to the balance sheet, in contrast to demand conditions. The response
of demand conditions for households is even negative in the short
run. In sum, the responses of the BLS data conﬁrm that it is the
supply of bank loans and not the demand that increases after an
expansion in the ECB’s balance sheet, which corroborates the exis-
tence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy in the spirit
of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1995). It
is also compatible with recent models for unconventional monetary
policy, such as Curdia and Woodford (2011) or Gertler and Karadi
(2011).
14As the BLS is a quarterly survey, the series is linearly interpolated to obtain
a monthly series. For more details about the construction of the series, see
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html.
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5.2 Financial Markets
The impact of a balance sheet shock on a number of ﬁnancial mar-
ket variables is shown in ﬁgure 6.15 Consistent with the rise in the
volume of bank loans, there is a signiﬁcant rise of M3 in the medium
term after an expansionary innovation to the ECB’s balance sheet.
Furthermore, there is a fall in the three-month EURIBOR rate,
which can be explained by the drop in EONIA, as well as by a
decline in the credit risk premium embedded in EURIBOR. There is
indeed a fall in the EURIBOR–OIS spread, which reﬂects the favor-
able impact of the balance sheet measures on the risk premium for
banks in the interbank market. In line with this, credit default swaps
(CDSs) for banks drop between 4 and 10 basis points. The liquid-
ity support of the ECB hence also lowers the probability investors
attach to a credit event in the banking sector.
Figure 6 further shows that equity prices increase after a bal-
ance sheet shock, although the error bands are very wide. There is
also a depreciation of the nominal eﬀective exchange rate of approx-
imately 0.4 percent. The latter is consistent with an exchange rate
channel of the balance sheet policies. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that a
balance sheet shock has no signiﬁcant impact on (risk-free) German
government bond yields. In contrast, there is a signiﬁcant decline
of the sovereign yield spreads vis-a`-vis Germany. The latter ﬁnd-
ing is in line with common perception and evidence (e.g., Acharya
and Steﬀen 2015) that in response to the ample ECB liquidity,
many banks have bought government bonds of euro-area countries
under ﬁnancial stress, and that this has lowered the spread between
the yields of these countries and the German bund. Overall, the
rise in the volume of bank lending to households and ﬁrms docu-
mented above, the decline of interest rate spreads, and the absence
of an impact on the risk-free (German) rate are compatible with
the models of Curdia and Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi
(2011).
15A caveat of the results shown in ﬁgure 6 is that our identiﬁcation scheme
weakly imposes a decline in the composite overall measure of ﬁnancial stress
(CISS) on impact. Nevertheless, it is useful to investigate whether beneﬁcial
eﬀects are observed in a wide range of ﬁnancial market segments, including its
persistence.
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Figure 6. Impact of Balance Sheet Shocks on Financial
Market Variables in the Euro Area
M3 Bank CDS rate (basis points)
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of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly.
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6. The Economic Relevance of the Balance Sheet Policies
In the previous section, we have documented that the ECB can suc-
cessfully stimulate economic activity and raise inﬂation by expand-
ing its balance sheet. Yet, it is not clear whether the consequences
have been economically meaningful. To examine the economic rele-
vance in more detail, we conduct two counterfactual simulations.16
In the ﬁrst, we measure how the macroeconomy would have evolved
without the one-year LTROs and the ﬁrst CBPP launched in the
summer of 2009. In the second, we do the same exercise for the three-
year LTROs implemented in December 2011 and March 2012. These
were two major policy decisions that clearly expanded the balance
sheet of the ECB. For both counterfactuals, we use the near-VAR
model with the (total) volume of bank lending and the bank lending
rate as Zt variables.
Counterfactuals require assumptions, which implies that the
results need to be taken with more than the usual degree of caution.
In particular, we implicitly assume that there are no changes in the
underlying economic structure (parameters of the VAR model) in
the counterfactual scenarios. This implies that the counterfactuals,
like any counterfactual based on VAR models, are sensitive to the
Lucas critique. For the CBPP, we shock the balance sheet of the
ECB (negatively) by €61 billion between July 2009 and June 2010
as the counterfactual scenario. This corresponds to the actual pur-
chases of the ECB during that period. For the one-year LTROs, we
shock the balance by €198 billion in June 2009, and by €82 billion
in December 2009. This is the net increase of the ECB’s total assets
in these months.17 Notice that the actual (gross) volume of lending
in the context of the one-year LTROs was, respectively, €442 and
€97 billion in these months, but several banks switched from other
16For an alternative counterfactual, we refer to Benati (2014). In his discussion
of our paper, he shows that a more subdued balance sheet response to ﬁnancial
stress during the sample period (by shrinking the parameters of the balance sheet
response to the CISS indicator) would have resulted in much more macroeconomic
volatility.
17Notice that we do not consider the one-year LTROs of October 2009. The
volume of these operations was €75 billion, but there was a net decline of total
assets in this month due to a substantial reduction in other types of lending by
the banking sector (partly because of improved macroeconomic conditions as a
consequence of the June LTRO).
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types of lending (e.g., MROs or three-month LTROs) to the one-year
LTROs. This can also be seen in ﬁgure 1. In sum, for the ﬁrst coun-
terfactual scenario, we shock the balance sheet in total by roughly
€341 billion between the summers of 2009 and 2010. In a similar way,
for the second counterfactual, we shock the balance sheet by €316
billion in December 2011, and by €272 billion in March 2012, i.e.,
€588 billion in total. Again, this is the net increase in total assets
observed in both months, which is considerably less than the actual
volume of €1,019 billion in three-year LTROs allocated by the ECB.
The results of both counterfactuals implied by the VAR model
are shown in, respectively, ﬁgures 7 and 8. The ﬁgures reveal that
the macro consequences have been substantial. For the ﬁrst coun-
terfactual, we observe that the recovery in economic activity of 2010
would have been much more sluggish without the one-year LTROs
and purchases of covered bonds. In particular, economic activity
would have been roughly 0.6 percent lower in the summer of 2010.
Also, the pickup of inﬂation would have been much more subdued,
with a persistent deviation from target. Furthermore, economic and
ﬁnancial stress (the CISS indicator) would have been a great deal
higher, while the pickup of bank lending would have been much
slower without the non-standard monetary policy measures taken
by the ECB.
A similar story emerges for the three-year LTROs counterfac-
tuals. Real GDP would have been approximately 1.2 percent lower
in 2012 without the programs, i.e., a much deeper recession than
the one we observed, while inﬂation would have been about 1.3 per-
centage points lower. Also noticeable is the strong collapse of bank
lending without the three-year LTROs, while the policy rate would
have hit the zero lower bound already in 2012.
Perhaps most striking for both counterfactuals is the fact that
the ultimate expansion of the balance sheet would have been more or
less the same without the extraordinary policy measures. This can
be explained by the worse macroeconomic and ﬁnancial conditions
in the absence of the measures. More speciﬁcally, according to the
estimated parameters of the VAR model, the lower level of economic
activity and higher stress on ﬁnancial markets would have resulted
in an endogenous rise of the balance sheet of the ECB. The endoge-
nous rise of the balance sheet is essentially the consequence of an
increased dependence of banks on the ECB for their liquidity needs
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Figure 7. Counterfactual Evolution of Macroeconomic
Aggregates without Implementation of One-Year LTROs
and CBPP1
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Figure 8. Counterfactual Evolution of Macroeconomic
Aggregates without Implementation of Three-Year LTROs
    actual evoluon     counterfactual implied by VAR (median, 16th and 84th percenles of posterior distribuon)
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in the context of the FRFA policy, in combination with the average
reaction function of the balance sheet to the macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial market conditions during the sample period. This ﬁnding
suggests that it is important for central banks to act preemptively,
i.e., the macroeconomic outcome is then much better for a similar
(ex post) balance sheet expansion.
7. The Eﬀects across Euro-Area Countries
It may be useful to also analyze how individual euro-area countries
are aﬀected by the balance sheet shocks. For that purpose, we include
output and consumer prices of each individual country in the Z-block
of the near-VAR presented in section 5.18 The eﬀects on economic
activity turn out to be quite diverse. Figure 9 shows that the eﬀects
of a central bank balance sheet shock on output are relatively large
in Germany, Austria, Finland, Estonia, Ireland, and Luxembourg.
The eﬀects are more subdued in France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, and
the Slovak Republic. The estimations further show that the impact
of the unconventional monetary policy measures of the ECB were
negligible in Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Cyprus.
For Greece, we even ﬁnd a puzzling negative response of output to a
balance sheet expansion. On the other hand, as shown in ﬁgure 10,
the eﬀects on consumer prices are much more similar across coun-
tries. Hence, there is little evidence that in countries where output
reacts more (less), inﬂation also reacts more (less). An explanation
for such a diﬀerent Phillips-curve type relationship across countries
is not straightforward and would need additional analysis, but this
is beyond the scope of this paper.
Since the peripheral countries of the euro area participated rela-
tively more in the non-standard monetary policy actions of the ECB,
the ﬁnding that the eﬀects of expansionary (and restrictive) central
bank balance sheet shocks turn out to be stronger in countries that
18Since individual countries are part of the euro-area aggregate, it is not neces-
sary to allow for feedback of the individual countries on the euro-area variables.
We can thus again use a block-diagonal VAR system, which ensures that the
dynamics of the euro-area variables are invariant to the inclusion of the indi-
vidual country variables, allowing for a comparison across countries (see also
Peersman and Smets 2003).
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Figure 9. Impact of Balance Sheet Shocks on Output in
Individual Member Countries
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Note: Figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles
of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly.
are generally less aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis is striking. A poten-
tial explanation is that a lot of banks in peripheral countries have not
been able to convert the extra liquidity into more lending to the pri-
vate sector because of their ﬁnancial fragility and low capitalization.
In particular, it is diﬃcult for banks to increase lending supply if they
are capital constrained. Accordingly, the macroeconomic eﬀects of
the balance sheet policies could be more subdued in countries where
banks are on average less capitalized. This conjecture is supported
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Figure 10. Impact of Balance Sheet Shocks on Consumer
Prices in Individual Member Countries
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Note: Figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles
of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly.
by the data shown in ﬁgure 11. The ﬁgure plots the correlation
between bank capital and the estimated eﬀects of the balance sheet
shocks on output across individual countries. Given that correlation
does not mean causation, we have to be careful when interpreting
the results, but they are nevertheless informative about a potential
relationship. More speciﬁcally, there is a strong positive correlation
(0.73) between the (maximum) impact of an innovation to the ECB’s
balance sheet on economic activity in an individual country and the
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Figure 11. Bank Capital and the Eﬀects of Balance Sheet
Shocks on Output in Euro-Area Countries
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the correlation between tier 1 capital ratio of the national
banking sector (average over sample) and the maximum eﬀect of balance sheet
shocks (median impulse responses) on output in the respective member country.
average tier 1 capital ratio of the respective consolidated national
banking system over the sample period. In other words, the trans-
mission of central bank liquidity support to the real economy seems
to be linked to the solvency of the banking system. If the central
bank injects liquidity but banks are not able or willing to lend to
households and ﬁrms because of their own ﬁnancial fragility, the
eﬀects on economic activity are more subdued. As a consequence,
countries with a weakly capitalized banking system also react less
to the unconventional monetary policies of the ECB.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the eﬀectiveness and transmission
of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies since the onset of
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the ﬁnancial crisis. Within an SVAR framework, we have identiﬁed
exogenous innovations to the central bank balance sheet for a given
policy rate, and estimated the dynamic eﬀects on the macroecon-
omy. We ﬁnd that euro-area output and consumer prices rise after
an increase in the balance sheet of the ECB. The eﬀects are quali-
tatively very similar to the impact of conventional monetary policy,
in particular the output eﬀects. This conﬁrms that unconventional
monetary policy actions that inﬂuence the size of the central bank
balance sheet can be eﬀective at stabilizing the economy. Our identi-
ﬁcation scheme, however, does not allow us to distinguish the eﬀects
of diﬀerent types of balance sheet expansion—for example, lending
operations versus outright purchases. This is a ﬁrst avenue for future
research.
Financial market and bank lending variables also react signif-
icantly to central bank balance sheet disturbances. We ﬁnd that
equity prices, lending volumes, and broad money rise after an expan-
sionary balance sheet shock, whereas the intra-euro-area sovereign
bond spread vis-a`-vis Germany, bank lending rates, bank CDSs,
and money-market rates fall. Financial markets and banks are thus
important in passing on ECB unconventional monetary policy to the
real economy. Based on survey responses of banks about their lend-
ing standards, we can conclude that the increase in bank lending
coincides with a loosening of lending standards, and not so much
with an increase in loan demand.
Counterfactual simulations show that the ECB’s balance sheet
measures have shielded the euro area from much worse macroeco-
nomic outcomes. Interestingly, even in the worse macroeconomic sce-
nario, the balance sheet would have increased by a similar amount.
This would not have been because of a proactive use of the balance
sheet by the central bank but rather because of increased demand
due to lower economic growth and more ﬁnancial stress. A sim-
ilar balance sheet expansion can therefore go hand in hand with
markedly diﬀerent macroeconomic outcomes.
The identiﬁed unconventional monetary policy shock seems to
aﬀect euro-area countries diﬀerently. Speciﬁcally, output reacts more
in countries that have been less aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis.
The diﬀerential reaction of output across countries turns out to be
strongly correlated with the degree of capitalization of the national
banking sector. Output increases more in countries with a relatively
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better capitalized banking sector. This seems to underscore the
importance of capitalization of the banking sector in transmitting
unconventional monetary policy to the real economy. Whether this
is indeed the case is another interesting avenue for future research.
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